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THE MUNCHAUSEN EFFECT
Subjectivity and Ideology
Pascale Gillot
This paper deals with the general topic of subjectivity and subjectiva-
tion, considered through a philosophical tradition opposed to the ‘phi-
losophies of consciousness’: that is, a philosophical tradition, from Spi-
noza to Althusser, that rejects as a myth the supposed primacy and pre-
social character of subjective identity. 
 The rejection of this ‘myth’ indeed stands at the core of the theory 
of ideology developed by Althusser in a famous text first published in 
1970, ‘Idéologie et appareils idéologiques d’État’ (‘Ideology and Ideo-
logical State Apparatuses’).1 This theory of ideology entails the concep-
tual disqualification of a pure, originary subjectivity that would be 
given before the inscription of human individuals in the institutions, 
apparatuses, and so on, of social formations. But it appears to be insep-
arable from a general, persistent questioning about subjectivation, since, 
according to the celebrated Althusserian claim, the fundamental mecha-
nism of ideology is nothing else but the interpellation of individuals as 
or into subjects (‘l’interpellation en sujet’). 
 Althusser’s theory of ideological interpellation was quite influen-
tial, as regards philosophy, anthropology, linguistics, and social sciences 
in general, in the intellectual context of the 1970s. It is still an object of 
important debates in contemporary philosophy, concerning the question 
of ‘recognition’, subjectivation, and their social conditions.2 
 It could seem on a first reading that this theory of subjective inter-
pellation presents some inner causal circularity, an undecidability, char-
acterized by an unsolvable conflict between a thesis and an antithesis. In 
that precise respect – that is, in its undecidable character – it reminds us 
of the dilemmatic, conflictual structure inherent to the antinomies of 
pure reason described by Kant in the ‘Transcendental Dialectic’ of the 
Critique of Pure Reason.3 To put it briefly, the Althusserian subject is 
always a subjected one; it is necessarily constituted inside the realm of 
ideology, which would mean the antecedence of the Law (ideology) 
with regard to the constitution of subjective identity. Yet at the very 
same time, the subject has always-already been a subject, and this is the 
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very condition for subjective recognition, for the answer of the ‘subject’ 
to the call of the Law. This could mean that in a peculiar way, there 
would be some ‘entity’ like a subject even before the process of ideologi-
cal interpellation; and this strange pre-existing subject would be a con-
dition for the very functioning of the interpellation–subjectivation 
mechanism. 
 In that respect, the paradoxical Althusserian subject, which would 
in a disconcerting way precede itself in the subjectivation process, might 
be described as a ‘Kippbild-subject’, oscillating in an endless, undecida-
ble manner between a constituted and a constituting dimension. The 
Kippbild figure, in the present case, would then be the paradoxical, 
multistable representation of an undecidable conflictuality. 
 As a matter of fact, the apparent contradiction in this subjectiva-
tion process theorized by Althusser has been sometimes described as a 
‘Munchausen effect’ (ME): an allusion to the fictionalized memoirs of 
Baron Munchausen, who, having fallen into a pond, pulled himself out 
of the pond by grasping his own hair.4 The ‘subject-effect’, in the 
Althusserian perspective, would present the same puzzling structure, the 
same causal circularity, as the grotesque adventure of Baron Mun-
chausen. The ME would in that sense designate the famous ‘circularity’ 
problem supposedly at work within the Althusserian theory of interpel-
lation, as it has been underscored by many authors and commentators.5 
 The question is then the following: Is this circularity structure an 
effective one, in the Althusserian theory of subjectivity, or is it only an 
‘appearance’? In other words, what does the antinomy show us on these 
matters, and wouldn’t it be possible, like Kant using the ‘skeptical 
method’ in the Transcendental Dialectic of the Critique of Pure Reason, 
to search for the hidden postulate, the ‘point of misunderstanding’, at 
the very basis of the ‘contradiction’ verdict?6
 In this paper, I shall explore first the hypothesis that the ME verdict 
addressed to Althusser’s theory might be symptomatic of an inadequate 
reading due to an ill-constructed problematization of subjectivation: a 
problematization articulated to the question of an ‘origin’, and thus 
leading to the so-called infinite dilemmas related to the ‘Kippbild-sub-
ject’. I will nevertheless try to show that one may still rightly evoke an 
ME, concerning not the Althusserian approach itself, but the subjectiva-
tion process as such: that is, the ‘subject-effect’, in so far as the latter is 
built upon a necessary, irreducible contradiction. For this argument, I 
will largely lean on the analyses propounded in the 1970s by the lin-
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guist and philosopher Michel Pêcheux, former student of Louis 
Althusser. These analyses are precisely concerned with ideology, dis-
course, subject-effect, and sense-effect.7
I .  T H E  A L T H U S S E R I A N  D I L E M M A  A B O U T  I D E O L O G I C A L 
S U B J E C T I V A T I O N :  T H E  C I R C U L A R I T Y  O F  T H E 
I N T E R P E L L A T I O N  A S  S U B J E C T 
Let us consider the main claims at work in the Althusserian theory of 
ideology, such as they were systematically developed in ‘Ideology and 
Ideological State Apparatuses’ (IISA):8
-  Ideology (the realm of the imaginary, the representation of the 
imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of 
existence) is the necessary element of human life in so far as it is 
inseparable from any kind of social formation. This structural 
necessity of ideology is asserted through the provocative Althusse-
rian claim: ‘ideology has no history’. It is directed against the tradi-
tional, mechanistic reduction of ideology to a mere vanishing echo, 
or reflection, of ‘the real life’. 
-  ‘Ideology has a material existence’ (Ideological State Apparatuses: 
Family, School, Church, Party, Syndicate, etc.).
-  ‘There is no ideology except by the subject and for subjects.’
-  ‘Ideology interpellates individuals as subjects’ (‘L’idéologie inter-
pelle les individus en sujets’). This last claim is specified as follows: 
‘There is no ideology except for concrete subjects, and this destina-
tion of ideology is only made possible by the subject: meaning, by 
the category of the subject and its functioning.’ And: ‘The category 
of the subject is only constitutive of all ideology insofar as all ideol-
ogy has the function (which defines it) of “constituting” concrete 
individuals as subjects’.9
Althusser illustrates this series of claims about the ideology–subjectiva-
tion conceptual device through a ‘theoretical scene’, which has the sta-
tus of a thought experiment. It is the famous scene of the ‘police hailing’ 
(‘Hey, you there!’), which is exemplary of the ideological ‘interpellation 
as subject’. It reveals the subjection structure inherent to any subjectiva-
tion process (the subjection to the Law). It is meant to show the inade-
quacy of the traditional problematic of free will and immediate self-
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transparency of consciousness; and it is also meant to replace the classi-
cal concept of a constituting subject with the concept of a constituted 
subject. The theoretical scene is described by Althusser in the following 
terms:
 
I shall then suggest that ideology ‘acts’ or ‘functions’ in such a way that it 
‘recruits’ subjects among the individuals (it recruits them all), or ‘trans-
forms’ the individuals into subjects (it transforms them all) by that very 
precise operation which I have called interpellation or hailing, and which 
can be imagined along the lines of the most commonplace everyday police 
(or other) hailing: ‘Hey, you there!’.
 Assuming that the theoretical scene I have imagined takes place in the 
street, the hailed individual will turn round. By this mere one-hundred-
and-eighty-degree physical conversion, he becomes a subject. Why? 
Because he has recognized that the hail was ‘really’ addressed to him, and 
that ‘it was really him who was hailed’ (and not someone else). […] 
 Naturally for the convenience and clarity of my little theoretical thea-
tre I have had to present things in the form of a sequence, with a before 
and an after, and thus in the form of a temporal succession. There are indi-
viduals walking along. Somewhere (usually behind them) the hail rings 
out: ‘Hey, you there!’ One individual (nine times out of ten it is the right 
one) turns round, believing/suspecting/knowing that it is for him, i.e. rec-
ognizing that ‘it is really he’ who is meant by the hailing. But in reality 
these things happen without any succession. The existence of ideology and 
the hailing or interpellation of individuals as subjects are one and the same 
thing.10
It seems on a first reading that these claims taken together present a cir-
cular structure: a logical circle, which takes the aspect of an antinomy, a 
conflict of reasoning with itself, in the Kantian way. The issue at stake 
here is the subjectivation process. A question appears: If the subject is 
not constituting (as it was considered to be in the classical metaphysics 
of the subject), but rather constituted and determined as such, in the 
very element of ideology, how does one recognize oneself as being a 
subject, this hailed, interpellated subject?
 The apparent antinomy or Kippbild structure at work in the 
Althusserian approach to the constitution of subjective identity would 
then sound as follows: on the one hand, an individual is not a subject 
before he has been subjected–interpellated by ideology: the Law of cul-
ture, in the reappropriation made by Althusser of the Lacanian sym-
bolic order.11 This is the anti-idealist, anti-Cartesian claim that links 
subjectivity to subjection. But on the other hand, and simultaneously, 
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one may say that the very condition for an individual to be a subject 
that is to respond to the interpellation of the Law is precisely that he 
recognizes himself as being indeed the particular addressee of the call. 
(‘It’s me, it’s really me!’) The ideological mechanism of the turning 
round or conversion, inherent to the subjectivation–humanization pro-
cess, supposes that the individual, even before turning round (‘It’s me!’), 
‘knows’ that he is – already – a subject: this subject.
 In a nutshell, interpellation – be it the police hailing, or, according 
to the ‘example’ of ‘the Christian religious ideology’ provided at the end 
of IISA,12 the divine performative Call that the (Absolute) Subject-God 
exerts upon the subject (Moses, the servant of God, receiving the Law) 
– constitutes the individual into subject. It is then a prerequisite for the 
elaboration–production of subjective identity itself: Moses, subjected to 
the Law, to the Other Subject, asserts through this very subjection his 
own identity, with the answer: ‘It is (really) I! I am Moses thy servant, 
speak and I shall listen!’. 
 Yet it appears, on the other hand, that the addressee of such an 
interpellation, the individual who turns round and responds to the 
External Call (the policeman, or God himself), recognizes himself as its 
‘destinataire’, as though the subject had always-already existed, even 
before being ‘hailed’ by the Other (the Law): that is, even before being 
constituted by and through this interpellation process. One could sup-
pose then some prior, not yet interpellated figure of subjectivity that 
would also represent a causal pre-condition for the functioning of the 
subjectivation–interpellation mechanism. 
 We reach here the disconcerting structure of what could appear as 
a ‘causal circularity’ at work in the subjectivation process described by 
Althusser, which could be named, following a formula by Michel 
Pêcheux, ‘the subject as the origin of the subject’.13 Such a logical circu-
larity, characteristic (in appearance) of the subjective constitution in the 
Althusserian theory, and which could also be seen as a circularity 
between the external and the internal, is the target of a critique con-
ducted by Slavoj Žižek in The Sublime Object of Ideology. According 
to Žižek, the ‘weak point’ of the Althusserian school on the topic of 
subjectivity would be that it fails in the task of explaining the subjecti-
vation process as such: that is, the way through which the inscription of 
the individual in the ‘external’ frame of the Ideological State Appara-
tuses (the Church, the School, etc.) could give birth to the subjective 
(inner) recognition of oneself in the interpellation mechanism.14 This 
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would lead Althusser to suppose implicitly, in a paradoxical way as 
regards his own theoretical premises, a subject at the origin of the sub-
ject: that is, precisely an ME, which would reveal at the same time the 
dead end of Althusser’s explanation. It appears undecidable, from 
Althusser’s perspective, whether the subject gets entirely constructed in 
the External Call, or, on the contrary, pre-exists its own interpellation. 
 We are confronted here, through this causal circularity, with the 
Kippbild structure typical of the Kantian antinomies: a thesis (the con-
stituted subject) and an antithesis (the always-already existing subject) 
oppose each other, but the discovery of the incompatibility between the 
thesis and the antithesis does not lead to any solution that would con-
sist in attributing a truth value to one proposition or to the other prop-
osition.
 One would be tempted to conclude, then, that Althusser’s theory 
itself is hopelessly circular, and that the absence of any solution regard-
ing the – internal or external – ‘cause’ of subjectivation should lead us 
to abandon such a theoretical path, initially meant to represent a con-
current explanation to the Cartesian paradigm of the Cogito. Such a 
conclusion, though, might be too hasty, if one precisely considers the 
Kantian argumentation about the antinomies and their undecidability. 
The theoretical conflict between the two antagonistic theses of the 
antinomy cannot, by definition, be solved as such. Yet, as we have 
already remarked, the Kantian recourse to the ‘skeptical method’ per-
mits going beyond this dialectical conflict between thesis and antithesis 
by showing that they constitute a wrong alternative, both being 
founded upon a false premise.15 
 Generally speaking, Kant’s critical approach may be inspiring for 
our purpose, in so far as it suggests that the analysis of the antinomy 
has a heuristic function: on the condition that the ‘antinomy’ should be 
adequately considered: that is, not as a well-constructed problem, but 
rather as a theoretical symptom, the result of a ‘category mistake’, as 
Gilbert Ryle would put it.16 Using the sceptical method, we can then 
engage in the symptomatological search for the ‘hidden postulate’ that 
grounds the – contestable – verdict of an antinomy at work in the 
Althusserian theory of the subject. After all, the author of IISA himself, 
asserting his main theses about ideological interpellation, did call atten-
tion to the fact that what seemed to be a temporal process (the constitu-
tion into subject) in reality did not happen in time: this point did not 
strike him as a sign of weakness in his own theory. On the contrary, he 
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insisted upon the specificity of such a paradoxical mechanism, which 
accounted for the structural illusion of the subject: that is, the illusion 
of being a free, non-determined subject, what he called ‘the elementary 
ideological effect’. He himself connected this ideological illusion about 
the obviousness or ‘evidentness’ of being a free, originary subject to 
another pseudo-obviousness, that is, to another myth: the ‘transpar-
ency’ of language.17 
I I .  T H E  M E  1 :  T H E  A P O R I A S  O F  T H E  O R I G I N A R Y  S U B J E C T , 
A C C O R D I N G  T O  A L T H U S S E R  A S  R E A D  B Y  P Ê C H E U X
I will examine the hypothesis that, in the last instance, the Althusserian 
subjectivation process appears to be an antinomy if, and only if, one 
presupposes that there must be some kind of subjective condition prior 
to the recognition act, before the turning round as an answer to the ide-
ological interpellation. 
 The analysis of the so-called antinomy is nevertheless interesting 
and has an epistemological function: it reveals, ultimately, that one falls 
unavoidably into a trap, a logical circle, if one tries to theorize the ques-
tion of subjectivation through the ideological framework defined by the 
problematic of the origin, the ‘first cause’, causa prima.
 Althusser saw these aporias, and this is particularly clear through 
the reading of the Althusserian texts on ideology, conducted by Michel 
Pêcheux in the 1970s. Such a reading will help us to dissolve a crucial 
misunderstanding concerning the ME about the subject: the ME, 
indeed, is located, not in Althusser’s texts, but, on the contrary, in the 
idealist theory of the subject of which he developed a radical critique. 
 Michel Pêcheux was a student of Louis Althusser at the École Nor-
male Supérieure in Paris (Rue d’Ulm). He wrote a few articles on ideol-
ogy in the Cahiers pour l’analyse18 (under the pseudonym of Thomas 
Herbert), before publishing an important book called Les vérités de la 
Palice (1975), translated into English under the title Language, Seman-
tics and Ideology (LSI). Pêcheux developed the Althusserian insights 
regarding ideology and subjective interpellation in relationship to struc-
tural linguistics, within the anti-idealist frame of a ‘discourse analysis’ 
(‘analyse du discours’), identified with a materialist, anti-psychologist 
‘theory of discourse’.19 He was then led to build what he called a ‘non-
subjectivist theory of the subject’.20
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 It is remarkable that Pêcheux himself mentions a ‘Munchausen 
effect’ regarding the topic of subjectivation. But according to him, the 
ME does not define, rigorously speaking, Althusser’s anti-subjectivist 
approach to the question of the subject. The ME characterizes, rather, 
subjectivism: that is, the repetition, in the field of theory itself, of the 
typical illusions produced by ideology – the illusions of meaning and of 
subject, the common illusions of a priority and ‘obviousness’ of mean-
ing (‘le sens’) and of subject, which were previously criticized by 
Althusser himself.21 The ME, in that respect, would be nothing but the 
typical circular structure of subjectivist and psychologist approaches in 
the fields of philosophy and semantics: a typical structure that would 
lead to the absurdity of asserting endlessly a subject at the origin of the 
subject, or a meaning at the origin of meaning.
 According to Pêcheux’s critique of semantics, which is directly 
influenced by Althusser, the vicious circle characteristic of the duplica-
tion, at the theoretical level, of the pseudo-obviousnesses about subject 
and meaning, is the following: 
The evident fact states: words have a meaning because they have a mean-
ing, and subjects are subjects because they are subjects: but behind the evi-
dent character there is the absurdity of a vicious circle in which one seems 
to be lifting oneself into the air, like Baron von Munchausen […].22
 
The fundamental and essential issue of the critical reference to the ME, 
in the third part of Pêcheux’s book, LSI, appears then to be anti-psy-
chologism. Indeed, the ME example intervenes another time in this 
book, in the Introduction, when Pêcheux evokes the Fregean critique of 
any psychological theory of knowledge. According to the logician Gott-
lob Frege, the reduction of a theory of knowledge to psychology leads 
to an absurdity:
 
‘Now since every act of cognition is realised in judgements, this means the 
breakdown of any bridge to the objective. And all our striving to attain to 
this can be no more than an attempt to draw ourselves up by our own 
bootstraps’ (‘sich am eigenen Schopfe aus dem Sumpfe zu ziehen’ – literally 
‘pull ourselves out of the bog by our own hair’).23 
This strategic recourse to the ME verdict for the needs of the battle 
against psychologism and its dead ends is interesting. Althusser and 
Pêcheux’s anti-psychologism follows in that precise respect the Fregean 
logicist tradition, which could be called, in other – Foucauldian – terms, 
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the ‘philosophy of concept’. The ME accusation, therefore, might be 
understood as being equally directed against a philosophical correlate of 
psychologism, namely subjectivism, the representation of a free, sponta-
neous subject, or the representation of the subject as origin – of its own 
identity, acts, and so on. 
 We may conclude from such a particular understanding of the ME, 
that one is confronted with an antinomy regarding the Althusserian 
subject if and only if one asks this question of its origin. But it has to be 
acknowledged that Althusser’s materialist approach consists precisely in 
refuting this problematic of the origin and in attempting to define the 
subjective condition through the category of the ‘subject-effect’, the sub-
ject as effect.
 The widely diffused hypothesis of an ME in the Althusserian theory 
of subjectivation appears then to leave aside significant theses involved 
in such a theory. First, such an ME regards the subject only in its ideal-
ist definition as primary subject: it defines the very illusion of being a 
constituting subject, as though the subject could endlessly precede itself. 
In the Althusserian theory, as it was understood by Pêcheux, on the 
contrary, the subject gets defined as a necessary ‘effect of the precon-
structed’ (‘un effet de préconstruit’). If we may allude to Pêcheux’s dis-
course analysis discussed below (Part III), the subject as subject of dis-
course is nothing but a paradoxical causa sui (the supposed prior sub-
ject) produced in reality as a result, an effect. It is the result of the 
interdiscourse dissimulated within an intradiscourse. The interdiscourse 
(the preconstructed), represents the complex whole of discursive forma-
tions, in so far as they are intertwined with ideological formations.24 It 
always-already marks the place of the subject, in the ambiguities of syn-
tax. At the same time, it conceals itself and its own causal effectiveness 
in the very production of its effects, which defines the typical causal 
structure of the unconscious and of ideology. 
 The concept of discursive formation plays a fundamental role here: 
although partly borrowed from Foucault, it is modified and reinserted 
within a Marxist theory of social–ideological formations (see note 19). 
Following the definition by Pêcheux, a discursive formation has to be 
understood as 
that which in a given ideological formation, i.e., from a given position in a 
given conjuncture determined by the state of class struggle, determines 
‘what can and should be said’.25 
 
 P A S C A L E  G I L L O T98
As to the intradiscourse, it is defined as
the operation of discourse with respect to itself (what I am saying now, in 
relation to what I have said before and what I shall say afterwards, i.e., the 
set of ‘co-reference’ phenomena that secure what can be called the ‘thread 
of the discourse’ as discourse of a subject).26 
The condition for the constitution of the subject-form is precisely the 
absorption-forgetting of the interdiscourse in the intradiscourse: ‘inter-
discourse appears to be the pure “already-said” of intradiscourse, in 
which it is articulated by “coreference”’.27 
 This inversion of causality lies at the heart of the subject-form: the 
forgetting of an exteriority (the preconstructed, the interdiscourse based 
upon an intertwining – ‘intrication’ – between discursivity and ideol-
ogy), that is, the dissimulation of the determination process linked to 
interdiscourse, produces this ‘interiority without exteriority’, which 
accounts for the fantasmatic structure of subjective identity. 
 This contradiction between ‘causa sui’ and ‘result’ is also funda-
mental in the constitution of the subject as other than itself, that is, as a 
speaking subject necessarily grasped into the symbolic network of shift-
ing effects and into the signifier process. In that respect, Pêcheux has 
recourse to Lacan’s definition of the subject, when he decides to con-
sider 
the subject as process (of representation) inside the non-subject constituted 
by the network of signifiers, in Lacan’s sense: the subject is ‘caught’ in this 
network – ‘common nouns’ and ‘proper names’, ‘shifting’ effects, syntactic 
constructions, etc. – such that he results as ‘cause of himself’, in Spinoza’s 
sense of the phrase. And it is precisely the existence of this contradiction 
(the production as a result of a ‘cause of itself’), and its motor role for the 
process of the signifier in interpellation-identification, which justifies me in 
saying that it is indeed a matter of a process, in so far as the ‘objects’ 
which appear in it duplicate and divide to act on themselves as other than 
themselves.28
In addition to depending on an idealist definition of the subject, the cir-
cularity problem furthermore emerges only in the field of a problematic 
of the origin: When was the subject constituted? What is prior to what 
(subject, interpellation, etc.)? But this problematic of the origin gets 
rejected by Althusser, precisely through the assertion of a ‘short-circuit’ 
between subjective identity and interpellation. By such a ‘short-circuit’ 
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device, that is, by the claim that the constitution into subject should not 
be conceived as being inscribed within a linear temporal frame, 
Althusser intends to show that the question of the origin of the subject, 
the question of its spontaneous existence, has no theoretical sense. It is 
a fantasmatic question, for the subject cannot stand for its own origin 
(causa sui), that is, independently from the symbolic–ideological inter-
pellation. It has always-already existed as inscribed into the symbolic 
order, that is, as a constituted subject. In the last instance, the circularity 
of the subjectivation process draws back to the circularity of the sym-
bolic order itself, or ‘The Law of Culture’ already described in the arti-
cle ‘Freud and Lacan’ (1964–65). The Law of Culture, Althusser main-
tains in reference to Lacan, necessarily precedes itself, according to a 
‘retroactiveness’ structure, which indicates that it is the very condition 
for humanization–subjectivation and that it has ‘no outside’, no origin 
and no end, just like ideology itself. The fundamental problem lies not 
in knowing how the small human being will transform itself as a sub-
ject, for, ‘in reality, it is Culture itself that constantly precedes itself, 
absorbing what will become a human subject’.29
I I I .  T H E  P E R S I S T E N T  C O N T R A D I C T I O N  A B O U T 
S U B J E C T I V I T Y :  T H E  P H A N T A S Y  E F F E C T  ( M E  I I )  A N D  T H E 
S U B J E C T  A S  P R O B L E M A T I C  ‘ C A U S A  S U I ’
Yet it has to be acknowledged that the antinomy regarding the subject 
reveals itself to be not so easily reducible. One must still admit that 
something, on the very topic of subjectivity, resists the critical reading 
just mentioned: a specific contradiction about the subject-effect that has 
something to do with what Althusser called ‘the elementary ideological 
effect’. 
 This is precisely what is at stake in another reference to the ME, in 
Part III (‘Discourse and Ideology(ies)’) of the 1975 book by Pêcheux. In 
this book, apart from the passage from the Introduction already quoted, 
one finds another direct mention of the ME: it concerns the constitutive 
illusion of subjectivity, related to the ideological interpellation, its retro-
active effect, and its structural contradiction as such. As though the sub-
ject itself were constructed upon a constitutive contradiction: the con-
tradiction of a causa sui produced as a result. The ME, involved in the 
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subjectivation–interpellation process, now gets explicitly defined – 
through a psychoanalytical terminology – as a ‘phantasy’ effect:
One of the consequences, I believe, of the necessary obliteration within the 
subject as ‘cause of himself’ [causa sui] of the fact that he is the result of a 
process, is a series of what one might call metaphysical phantasies, all of 
which touch on the question of causality: for example the fantasy of the 
two hands each holding a pencil and each drawing the other on the same 
sheet of paper, and also that of the perpetual leap in which one leaps up 
again with a great kick before having touched the ground; one could 
extend the list at length. I shall leave it at that, with the proposal to call 
this phantasy effect – by which the individual is interpellated as subject – 
the ‘Munchausen effect’, in memory of the immortal baron who lifted him-
self into the air by pulling on his own hair.
 If it is true that ideology ‘recruits’ subjects from amongst individuals 
(in the way soldiers are recruited from amongst civilians) and that it 
recruits them all, we need to know how ‘volunteers’ are designated in this 
recruitment, i.e., in what concerns us, how all individuals accept as evident 
the meaning of what they hear and say, read and write (of what they 
intend to say and of what it is intended be said to them) as ‘speaking sub-
jects’: really to understand this is the only way to avoid repeating, in the 
form of a theoretical analysis, the ‘Munchausen effect’, by positing the 
subject as the origin of the subject, i.e., in what concerns us, by positing 
the subject of discourse as the origin of the subject of discourse.30
Subject then, understood as the subject of discourse, is not its own ori-
gin. Yet, the ‘obliteration’, within the subject itself, of its constituted-
constructed character, is, paradoxically, a necessary one. And such a 
paradoxical, yet unavoidable, obliteration represents indeed one main 
characteristic of the ‘subject-effect’. One recognizes here the specific 
mark of the elementary ideological effect related to the pseudo-obvious-
ness of being a free, spontaneous subject: the fantasmatic cause of itself, 
causa sui.
 Pêcheux tried to investigate and analyse this inner contradiction 
about the subject. For this purpose, he developed his work in a singular 
and acute manner, through a double reference. He made recourse to his-
torical materialism, particularly to the Althusserian theory of ideology 
(itself deeply influenced by a Freudian–Lacanian perspective on the 
logic of the Unconscious); but he also referred to psychoanalysis, espe-
cially the – anti-psychologist – Lacanian perspective about the constitu-
tive division of the subject, the Ichspaltung. His work was – and is – 
quite original and stimulating, for it gave birth to a new theoretical 
 
 S U B J E C T I V I T Y  A N D  I D E O L O G Y 101
frame, at the intersection of philosophy and linguistics, in a materialist 
perspective: the theory of discourse. This new framework was at the 
basis of Pêcheux’s particular linguistic–philosophical approach to the 
subject – and to its constitutive contradiction – conceived as subject of 
discourse. It seems necessary, thus, to mention some central claims 
inherent to this ‘theory of discourse’.
 The theory of discourse, also called discourse analysis, should not 
be confounded with Foucault’s discourse analysis, although it is partly 
reworked from Foucauldian concepts, like the concept of discursive for-
mation (see note 19). It permits us to conceive the subject not as a prin-
ciple, but as an ‘effect’: the effect of a certain discursive–ideological 
device. To this end, Pêcheux takes up again the Althusserian linking 
between subjectivity and subjection. But he aims at ‘filling the gaps’ in 
the Althusserian theory: that is, in the present case, the still unclear gen-
eral homology propounded in IISA between Ideology and Unconscious, 
and the ideological production of the subject.
 In order to clarify this crucial question, he makes an important, 
even if very critical, recourse to linguistics, that is, to the scientific tradi-
tion opened by Ferdinand de Saussure, and also, quite remarkably, to 
analytic philosophy, as his quotations of the works by Rudolf Carnap 
and, above all, by Gottlob Frege indicate.
 The general goal is to develop a scientific theory of ideology, insep-
arable from an anti-idealist understanding of the subject-effect and of 
the sense-effect (or meaning-effect). The recourse to the concept of dis-
course, for this programme, is crucial. It is exemplary of an attempt to 
go beyond the traditional alternative between a psychological semiol-
ogy, and a pure formalism represented by the tradition of the theory of 
syntax opened by Frege and Carnap. This new theorization of discourse 
is deeply influenced by structuralism. At the same time, it criticizes the 
Saussurian dichotomy between la langue (language) – seen as an imper-
sonal, systematic device and object of science – and la parole (speech), 
which would imply the activity of a subject, and whose personal dimen-
sion would prevent a properly scientific approach. In the Saussurian 
perspective, the category of subject, closely related to the category of 
sense-meaning, seems then to be left outside the grip of science. The use 
of the concept of discourse, by contrast, acknowledges the importance 
of ambiguities in the sphere of human language, hence the particular 
interest dedicated, at the beginning of LSI, to the functioning of subor-
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dinate propositions, and to the classical grammatical distinction 
between explicative and determinative propositions.31
 The persistent opacity, or ambiguity, of explicative/determinative 
subordinate propositions (of the type: ‘the man who is rational is free’ – 
‘L’homme qui est raisonnable est libre’)32 marks the very fluctuating 
character of the distinction between Logic and Rhetoric within human 
speech. In that respect, these structural opacities (still denied, Pêcheux 
argues, by the formalist theory of syntax renewed by Noam Chomsky) 
always-already show the place of the subject – the subject of discourse. 
The subject, as a consequence, is nothing but an effect of an involuntary 
appropriation, in the intradiscourse, of a preconstructed discursive–ide-
ological device, the interdiscourse. To put it more accurately, the subject 
– of discourse – appears to be the paradoxical consequence of a consti-
tutive intertwining between the intradiscourse (the ‘personal’ dimension 
of discourse), and the interdiscourse (the ‘public’ dimension, which con-
ceals itself as such in the speech acts and takes the appearance of a 
spontaneous discourse). In a disconcerting way, this linguistic structural 
interlacing between the personal and the public dimensions makes the 
classical conceptual partition between interior and exterior quite irrele-
vant for the conceptualization of subjectivity as – linguistic and ideolog-
ical – effect. 
 This move allows us to reintroduce the category of subject within 
the scientific frame; it implies renouncing a mere formalism and choos-
ing a materialist epistemology, which includes the ‘external factors’: 
that is, the social–historical or ideological factors, inside the realm of 
linguistic theory. At that stage, the relationship between linguistic the-
ory and the Althusserian theory of ideology can be grasped. 
 To put it briefly, the subject is no longer identified with the individ-
ual, with the free person as the principle of its acts (such as speech acts), 
nor even with the subject of enunciation; it is rather understood as a 
produced subject, a preconstructed subjective position, always-already 
taken within a discursive configuration.33 In that respect, the analysis of 
discourse is particularly concerned with the very ambiguities of dis-
course itself, its failures and traps: that is, with the very interstices in the 
discourse that mark the place of the subject. Analysis of discourse, as 
such, represents a significant specification of the theory of ideology, in a 
materialist perspective, which also draws the new lines of an ‘anti-sub-
jectivist theory of the subject’.
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 One main postulate, in Pêcheux’s programme, is the following: the 
‘obviousness’ of sense, just as the so-called obviousness of being a sub-
ject, a free subject, is essentially illusory. It is constructed inside the dis-
cursive–ideological process. Yet the solution developed by Pêcheux for 
the Kippbild structure of subjectivation could appear as not entirely sat-
isfying. It might seem to emphasize the theoretical importance of the 
constitution process, since this materialist perspective claims that there 
is no such thing as a free, prior subject, and that subjectivity is a pre-
constructed effect. It would consequently seem to consider as secondary 
the other part of the Althusserian characterization of the subject, 
namely the thesis that there is an always-already constituted subject that 
recognizes itself as the addressee of the interpellation. In short, 
Pêcheux’s perspective would seem to elude rather than answer the ques-
tion of reconnaissance, recognition. Finally then, the Kippbild structure 
of subjectivity would offer some resistance to the materialist linguistic–
philosophical reading just outlined.
 What is at stake again here is the richness and the intricate charac-
ter of the topic of subjectivity in its Althusserian meaning. This should 
lead us to investigate the reasons why the Kippbild structure cannot be 
dissolved completely; why it cannot, in the last instance, be simply iden-
tified with an illusory dilemmatic structure, that is, with an ill-con-
structed problem. 
 But precisely, on that neuralgic point, Pêcheux himself can still help 
us better understand such a complexity and irreducibility. He explains 
indeed that the subject-effect is not merely the result of a process, but a 
result that is always anticipated. The subject, then, can be as such 
understood through the structure of a specific contradiction, namely the 
(irreducible) contradiction of ‘a causa sui produced as a result’, accord-
ing to the formula already mentioned. The main intertwined concepts 
involved in Pêcheux’s possible answer to the hypothetic accusation of 
reductionism are the concept of retroactiveness (the retroactiveness of 
symbolic–ideological interpellation) and the concept of obliteration bor-
rowed from psychoanalysis: that is, the necessary obliteration of the 
subject’s conditions of constitution by and in the subject itself. These 
concepts reveal the structural paradox at the very principle of the sub-
jective condition. 
 The following passage from LSI is particularly enlightening on this 
topic: 
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In fact, what the thesis ‘Ideology interpellates individuals as subjects’ des-
ignates is indeed that ‘non-subject’ is interpellated-constituted as subject by 
Ideology. Now, the paradox is precisely that interpellation has, as it were, 
a retroactive effect, with the result that every individual is ‘always-already 
a subject’ […].34 
Clearly, the author of LSI does not try to eliminate the paradoxical 
nature of this ‘always-already’ existing subject from the realm of ideo-
logical interpellation. On the contrary, as stressed above, he appears to 
follow the Althusserian insight about the retroactiveness of the Law of 
Culture. This reactivation is certainly crucial for an understanding of 
how the subject might constantly ‘precede itself’ without being its own 
origin. Let us recall that Althusser, when he elaborated the concept of 
the ‘Law of Culture’ in his article ‘Freud and Lacan’, was influenced by 
Rousseau, but also, simultaneously, by Lacan and the notion of sym-
bolic order. It is remarkable indeed that the concept of a retroactiveness 
of the symbolic–ideological interpellation, which Pêcheux developed on 
the basis of the Althusserian insights, recalls what Lacan in his Écrits 
named the ‘retroversion effect’ (‘l’effet de rétroversion’).35 For Lacan, 
this ‘retroversion effect’ is characteristic of the subject in so far as the 
subject never coincides with itself: it tends to become what it had 
already been, according to a temporal distortion that differentiates the 
subject from the illusory autonomous ego, hence the assertion of a mis-
recognition function essential to subjective reflexivity and ‘recognition’. 
Undoubtedly, Pêcheux’s conception of the paradoxical, temporal distor-
tion as the principle of subjectivation is strongly indebted to the Lacan-
ian theorization of the subject.
 This structural retroactiveness of the interpellation–subjectivation 
process is inseparable from the obliteration, or ‘forgetting’. As a matter 
of fact, such an obliteration is not denied by Pêcheux either, and gets, 
on the contrary, explicitly described as necessary, since it is constitutive 
of the subject as such, and accounts for its irreducible paradoxical 
nature. Pêcheux thus refers in the passage quoted at the beginning of 
this section to ‘the necessary obliteration within the subject as “cause of 
himself” of the fact that he is the result of a process’.36 It is this very 
obliteration that is understood as leading to a series of ‘metaphysical 
phantasies’, among which one counts, of course, the subjective ME.
 In other words, the structure of a necessary obliteration, entailed 
by the retroactiveness of the symbolic order, lies at the very ‘heart’ of 
the subject. In Pêcheux’s theory of discourse, the subject-form is, of 
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course, obtained through a process of forgetting as regards the anteced-
ence of the unasserted – the interdiscourse – with respect to the intradis-
course itself. But this dissimulation of the primacy of interdiscourse, 
correlated to the fantasmatic causal inversion, indeed gets specified as a 
double forgetting process. This double forgetting is compared by 
Pêcheux to the Freudian theory of repression, in so far as it can be con-
sidered as a twofold repression: a repression dependent on the Uncon-
scious system, and a repression dependent on the Preconscious system. 
Pêcheux isolates, in his theory of the subject-form of discourse, a first 
type of forgetting, which concerns the general dissimulation of the exte-
riority of interdiscourse within the discursive formation in which the 
subject is inscribed. But this ‘forgetting no. 1’ is doubled by a second 
forgetting, the ‘forgetting no. 2’, through which the subject identifies 
himself with the discursive formation that dominates him: this forget-
ting no. 2 is then 
the ‘forgetting’ by which every speaking subject ‘selects’, from the interior 
of the discursive formation which dominates him, i.e., from the system of 
utterances, forms and sequences to be found there in relations of para-
phrase, one utterance, form or sequence and not another, even though it is 
in the field of what may be reformulated in the discursive formation con-
sidered.37 
The double structure of the forgetting here is the very sign of its neces-
sity. This necessity of obliteration or ‘forgetting’ ultimately refers then 
to the specific and paradoxical effectiveness or causality of Ideology in 
so far as it may be compared, and identified, with the causality of the 
Unconscious. It consists in dissimulating itself as a cause through the 
production of its effects, which reminds the reader of the Althusserian 
‘structural causality’, already described in Reading Capital as ‘the effec-
tiveness of an absent cause’ (‘l’efficace d’une cause absente’). According 
to Pêcheux, 
the common feature of the two structures called respectively ideology and 
unconscious is the fact that they conceal their own existence within their 
operation by producing a web of ‘subjective’ evident truths, ‘subjective’ 
here meaning not ‘affecting the subject’, but ‘in which the subject is consti-
tuted’.38
The crucial implication here is that the subjectivation process responds 
to the very logic of ideology, in so far as such a logic is linked to the 
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logic of Unconscious itself (the effectiveness of an absent cause). One 
must admit then the importance of such a homology for Pêcheux’s par-
ticular project, which consists in developing the Althusserian pro-
gramme: to propound a theory of ideology in the same sense in which 
Freud propounded a theory of the unconscious. The homology is partic-
ularly developed in the singular frame of his own theoretical contribu-
tion, discourse analysis, in so far as the relationship between interdis-
course and intradiscourse is concerned: such a relationship, the dissimu-
lation of interdiscourse within intradiscourse, accounts for the 
constitution of this inversion structure, which is the subject-form.39
 We may add at this point that Pêcheux’s linguistic and philosophi-
cal understanding of the subterranean effectiveness of ideology leans on 
a precise and neuralgic use of psychoanalytical categories, such as, for 
instance, the ‘strangeness in the familiar’, according to Pêcheux’s partic-
ular understanding of the Freudian Unheimlichkeit.40 The insertion of 
Freudian–Lacanian categories within the argumentation device of LSI, 
and inside discourse analysis in general, reveals the theoretical original-
ity, the richness, of the attempt by Pêcheux to link theory of ideology 
and theory of the unconscious in the fields of Marxism, philosophy, and 
linguistics. This attempt is particularly striking as concerns his under-
standing of the structural inner ‘discrepancy’ between the interpellated 
subject and the ‘always-already’ existing subject, which makes explicit 
recourse to the terminology of ‘contradiction’.41 
 This last point, connected to the claim of the necessity of oblitera-
tion and retroactiveness in the very constitution of the subject, shows 
that Pêcheux’s fundamental perspective, far from being mechanistic or 
reductionist, might be heard as a singular development of Lacanian 
claims about the Ichspaltung and the structural, irreducible contradic-
tion of the I that is the subject. We have already noticed the importance 
of the Lacanian concept of the ‘retroversion effect’ as regards the con-
ceptualization of the ‘retroactiveness’ of interpellation. The reading of 
Lacan is also crucial for Pêcheux, if we consider his own thesis about 
the existence of a ‘process of the signifier, in interpellation-identifica-
tion’ meant as the process of subjectivation that Pêcheux himself defines 
as operating by ‘contradiction’. Recourse is made, for that scope, to the 
Lacanian understanding of the ‘signifier’ as ‘what represents the subject 
for another signifier’.42 Such a reference to Lacan is also meant, quite 
remarkably, to refute the myth of a prior subjectivity, antecedent to the 
symbolic grip: that is the grip of the Unconscious, which is also the grip 
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of ideology. This materialist use of Jacques Lacan’s work appears typi-
cal of Pêcheux’s strategy, and more generally of what was called the 
Althusserian–Lacanian school in the 1960s–70s in France, with Jacques-
Alain Miller, Jean-Claude Milner, and so many others.43 It consists in 
rejecting the ‘idealist reinscription of Lacan’s work’ from the part of 
psychoanalytical circles that disconnected the research on the uncon-
scious from the research on ideology.44 As a matter of fact, this strategy 
refutes by anticipation the contemporary, rather misleading reading of 
the Lacanian perspective about the subject as being irreconcilable, and 
even contradictory, with the Althusserian perspective about subjectiva-
tion–interpellation.45 
To conclude, it seems that one may find ultimately two moments of the 
Kippbild structure about subjectivity, understood through the concept 
of a ‘causal circularity’.
 The first figuration of the Kippbild (ME 1) would be the antinomy, 
critically analysed as the symptom of an ill-constructed problem in the 
field of theory, namely subjectivism: in that respect, the Althusserian 
insights about the aporias of any questioning about the origin concern-
ing, simultaneously, sense (or ‘meaning’), and subject, remain central. 
The heuristic function of the antinomy should not be neglected in so far 
as it authorizes the inquiry about ‘the hidden postulate’. This is pre-
cisely the epistemological condition for a materialist (that is, anti-psy-
chologist) theory of the subject, such as was propounded after Althusser 
by Pêcheux in the field of a critical approach to traditional semantics. 
 The second instance of the Kippbild structure here considered (ME 
2) is the insistent, irreducible contradiction of subjectivation, which rep-
resents the singularity and specificity of the subjective condition, 
grounded upon a necessary obliteration of its own lack of originarity: 
the obliteration of its constituted character. Here lies the very impossi-
bility of the subject, which accounts for its paradoxical, vanishing being 
(irreducible to the imaginary fullness of the ego): such a paradoxical, 
contradictory nature of the subject was already underlined by Lacan in 
his Écrits, which was a crucial reference for Pêcheux. The latter indeed 
did not try to avoid or reduce such an inner contradiction himself; he 
rather intended to explore it and to understand its singular structure, 
through an inquiry about the ‘subject of discourse’. Such a linguistic–
philosophical approach to the ‘subject-effect’ – led in the intellectual 
and political context of the 1970s, under the influence of structuralism, 
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psychoanalysis, and (non-mechanistic) Marxism – aimed at tracking 
down the split figure of subjectivity, its void and its failures. It did so 
within the element of discourse and ideology, beyond the traditional 
frontier between ‘private’ and ‘public’, as the strategic use of the con-
ceptual couple intradiscourse/interdiscourse indicates. In its original and 
particular reading of Althusser and Lacan – or Althusser with Lacan – 
Pêcheux’s approach still represents one of the most stimulating attempts 
to understand the specificity of the subjective condition. This attempt 
indeed avoids two symmetrical traps equally powerful in contemporary 
philosophy, the social sciences, and cognitive science: psychologism as 
well as plain reductionism. 
 A long-lasting question remains, at the end of this analysis: What 
could be the relationship between the two figures of the Kippbild-ME 
about the subject, that is, between ME 1 and ME 2? There must be a 
relationship, and perhaps ME 1 – that is, subjectivism – might ulti-
mately be considered as the consequence of an attempt to reduce the 
logical contradiction upon which the subject is built up (ME 2). The 
persisting strength of Pêcheux’s perspective on that topic consists in 
having rejected such a theoretical temptation. He engaged instead in a 
systematic confrontation with this fundamental paradox of the subject, 
which is indeed particularly crucial in the case of the ‘subject of dis-
course’. For anyone interested in the still-relevant programme of a non-
subjectivist theory of the subject, this should constitute a good reason to 
go back to Pêcheux’s texts, which have somehow been left aside in the 
last few decades. 
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Discourse’: ‘Every discursive formation, by the transparency of the meaning con-
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stituted in it, conceals its dependence on the “complex whole in dominance” of 
discursive formations, itself imbricated with the complex of ideological forma-
tions […]. I propose to call this “complex whole in dominance” of discursive 
formations “interdiscourse”, with the qualification that it too is subject to the 
law of unevenness-contradiction-subordination which I have described as char-
acterising the complex of ideological formations’ (p. 113). 
25 Ibid., 9, p. 111.
26 Ibid., p. 116.
27 Ibid., p. 117.
28 Ibid., 8, p. 108.
29 Louis Althusser, Psychanalyse et sciences humaines. Deux conférences (1963–
1964) (Paris: Le Livre de Poche, 1996), Seconde conférence, pp. 91–96. 
30 Pêcheux, LSI, 8, pp. 108–09.
31 On the strategic philosophical use of this linguistic–grammatical question, see 
Pêcheux, LSI, Introduction, pp. 12–13 and Chapter 1, pp. 21–39.
32 Ibid., 5, pp. 78–79.
33 Ibid., 9, ‘The Subject-Form of Discourse’, pp. 110–29.
34 Ibid., 8, p. 106.
35 Jacques Lacan, ‘Subversion du sujet et dialectique du désir dans l’inconscient 
freudien’, in Écrits (Paris: Seuil, 1966), pp. 793–827 (pp. 808–09). 
36 Pêcheux, LSI, 8, p. 108.
37 Ibid., 9, p. 123.
38 Ibid., 8, p. 104.
39 Ibid., 9, p. 117: ‘[…] it can indeed be said that intradiscourse, as the “thread of 
discourse”, of the subject, is strictly an effect of interdiscourse on itself, an “inte-
riority” wholly determined as such “from the exterior”. The character of the 
subject-form, with the spontaneous ideology it contains, will consist precisely in 
an inversion of this determination […]’. 
40 Ibid., 8, p. 107.
41 Ibid., pp. 106–07.
42 Ibid., p. 108.
43 See the Cahiers pour l’analyse, published between 1966 and 1969 by students of 
Louis Althusser, in the framework of the ‘Cercle d’Epistémologie de l’École Nor-
male Supérieure’. 
44 Pêcheux, LSI, 8, p. 104, note 1.
45 See in particular Žižek, The Ticklish Subject, Chapter 5.
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